In Ukraine, Putin Also Wants to Take Over the Orthodox Church. Which, However, Is Almost Entirely Opposed

The 28-point pea­ce plan endor­sed by Donald Trump, which is hea­vi­ly bia­sed in favor of Vladimir Putin, inclu­des among its pro­vi­sions, along with the intro­duc­tion of Russian as an offi­cial lan­gua­ge in Ukraine, the full reco­gni­tion of the “local sec­tion of the Russian Orthodox Church.”

This is a demand that Putin con­si­ders essen­tial, having made it back in the very brief and frui­tless mee­ting held in Istanbul on June 2 bet­ween Russian and Ukrainian emis­sa­ries, rei­te­ra­ting it two days later in his tele­pho­ne con­ver­sa­tion with Pope Leo XIV.

But this tou­ches a raw ner­ve in reli­gious life in Ukraine. In August of 2024, in fact, a law was pas­sed in Kyiv, no. 3894, which Patriarch Kirill imme­dia­te­ly bran­ded from Moscow as “the wor­st per­se­cu­tion of Christians sin­ce the times of Nero and Diocletian.”

And from Rome, Pope Francis also rai­sed his pro­te­st, at the end of the Angelus on August 25 : “Please, let no Christian Church be abo­li­shed direc­tly or indi­rec­tly. Churches are not to be tou­ched!”

Essentially, the new law bans any reli­gious orga­ni­za­tion in Ukraine that has its “cen­ter” in Russia and is “gover­ned” by Russia. Thereby put­ting on the line the exi­sten­ce of the more popu­lous of the Orthodox Churches pre­sent in Ukraine, the one histo­ri­cal­ly affi­lia­ted with the Moscow Patriarchate, which instead has no ties to the other, youn­ger Orthodox Church foun­ded in Ukraine in 2018 with the appro­val of the ecu­me­ni­cal patriarch of Constantinople, with the con­se­quent bit­ter rift bet­ween him and Kirill.

The pro­ce­du­re requi­red by law to ascer­tain that Church’s effec­ti­ve and ongoing sub­ju­ga­tion to Moscow and con­se­quen­tly deci­de on its ban has not yet been con­clu­ded, but in the mean­ti­me a very hea­ted con­tro­ver­sy has ari­sen, in Ukraine and beyond.

The heads of other Christian Churches pre­sent in Ukraine, inclu­ding the major arch­bi­shop of the Greek Catholic Church, Sviatoslav Shevchuk, expres­sed their appro­val of law no. 3894, in the name of “the right and duty of the sta­te to ensu­re natio­nal secu­ri­ty, respon­ding to the pos­si­ble exploi­ta­tion of reli­gious orga­ni­za­tions by aggres­sor sta­tes.”

While many inde­pen­dent and com­pe­tent obser­vers and ana­lysts belie­ve that it will be hard for this illi­be­ral law, as devi­sed, to pass muster with the inter­na­tio­nal con­ven­tions gua­ran­teeing reli­gious free­dom, to which Ukraine has also acce­ded.

But the con­tro­ver­sy is even more hea­ted within the very Church that is at risk of being era­di­ca­ted. The con­ten­tion has come out of hiding into public view, and has been expres­sed in oppo­sing sta­te­men­ts by autho­ri­ta­ti­ve cle­rics. Two in par­ti­cu­lar : Metropolitan Sylvester, rec­tor of the Kyiv Theological Academy and arch­bi­shop of Bilhorod on the Black Sea coa­st, not far from Odessa, and Metropolitan Theodosiy, arch­bi­shop of Cherkasy in the midd­le of the coun­try.

Sylvester repre­sen­ts the great majo­ri­ty of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which bro­ke with the mother Church fol­lo­wing the Russian aggres­sion of February 2022. And he ful­ly sup­ports what was deci­ded by the Synod of this same Church, hea­ded by Metropolitan Onufriy, on May 27, 2022, at the Feofaniya Monastery in Kyiv (in the pho­to).

On that occa­sion, eve­ry for­mu­la of depen­den­ce on the Russian Patriarchate was eli­mi­na­ted from the sta­tu­tes of this Orthodox Church, it was deci­ded to no lon­ger recei­ve the holy chri­sm each year from the Church of Moscow, and per­mis­sion was given to omit from the litur­gies the name of Patriarch Kirill, alrea­dy spon­ta­neou­sly drop­ped by a lar­ge num­ber of bishops and priests after the begin­ning of the aggres­sion.

What the Synod could not deci­de – thou­gh aspi­ring to do so – was auto­ce­pha­ly, that is, a sta­te of full auto­no­my for that same Church. This is becau­se in the Orthodox world any auto­ce­pha­ly, to be valid, must be appro­ved by other sister Churches, in a pro­cess that can take years.

But that this is the goal of Metropolitan Onufriy and most of his bishops was con­fir­med by the solemn litur­gy held at the Kyiv Theological Academy on May 27, 2025, the third anni­ver­sa­ry of that pre­vious Synod, with Onufriy once again reaf­fir­ming “the une­qui­vo­cal sepa­ra­tion from the Church of Moscow” and the hope that “the enti­re fami­ly of ‘auto­ce­pha­lous’ Orthodox Churches will sup­port us moral­ly, appro­ve our inde­pen­den­ce and regi­ster it with due distinc­tion.”

But the trou­ble is that not even the­se repea­ted and con­vin­ced acts of inde­pen­den­ce have shel­te­red this Ukrainian Orthodox Church from the rigors of law no. 3894, accor­ding to which, to ban it, it is suf­fi­cient that its depen­den­ce con­ti­nue to be writ­ten – as it is – in the sta­tu­tes of the Moscow Patriarchate.

But there’s more. From Moscow, Patriarch Kirill also trans­la­tes into prac­ti­ce this clai­med supre­ma­cy of his.

Of the 53 epar­chies, or dio­ce­ses, of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, 10 have now ended up under Russian occu­pa­tion in the eastern regions of the coun­try : Berdiansk, Horlivka, Dzhankoi, Donetsk, Luhansk, Nova Kakhovka, Rovenkiv, Severodonetsk, Simferopol, and Theodosia. And for each of them nei­ther the Synod nor Metropolitan Onufriy is able any lon­ger to deci­de any­thing, to the point of having autho­ri­zed the respec­ti­ve bishops to act on their own ini­tia­ti­ve, pen­ding the resump­tion of con­tact.

But in fact the­se 10 dio­ce­ses are alrea­dy ful­ly in the grip of the Moscow Patriarchate, which has even begun remo­ving some of their bishops – star­ting with Metropolitan Hilarion of Donetsk and Mariupol – and appoin­ting its own of Russian natio­na­li­ty. From Kyiv, Onufriy refu­ses to reco­gni­ze the­se deve­lo­p­men­ts, but rea­li­sti­cal­ly the­se dio­ce­ses are now con­si­de­red lost, as it is unli­ke­ly that tho­se ter­ri­to­ries will be resto­red to Ukraine.

In any case, the high­han­ded­ness of the Moscow Patriarchate does nothing but inten­si­fy the oppo­si­tion to Russia in Ukraine, both poli­ti­cal and reli­gious. In the judg­ment of Metropolitan Sylvester, the Russian aggres­sion has mar­ked a “point of no return.” After the end of the war it will no lon­ger be pos­si­ble or even thin­ka­ble that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church should resu­me cano­ni­cal subor­di­na­tion to Moscow.

Yet this resump­tion is pre­ci­se­ly the aspi­ra­tion of that pro-Russian mino­ri­ty of Ukrainian Orthodox given voi­ce to in the public deba­te by Metropolitan Theodosiy.

Indeed, in Theodosiy’s opi­nion the Ukrainian Orthodox Church’s subor­di­na­tion to Moscow has not been affec­ted even by the deci­sions made by the Synod of May 27, 2022 : a Synod, he said, “not free,” con­duc­ted under poli­ti­cal pres­su­re and even “under threat of arms.” Accusations publi­cly denied by a dozen bishops but sar­ca­sti­cal­ly reis­sued on Russian-language Telegram chan­nels, all on Theodosiy’s side.

But if that were real­ly the case – Sylvester objec­ted to Theodosiy – the vic­to­ry would go pre­ci­se­ly to tho­se who want to apply to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, sin­ce it is still for­mal­ly subor­di­na­te to Moscow, the rigors of law no. 3894.

To bet­ter under­stand what could hap­pen if this law were imple­men­ted, it must be kept in mind that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, with the Kyiv Metropolitanate as its admi­ni­stra­ti­ve body, does not have the sta­tus of a legal per­son, but is reco­gni­zed as the reli­gious asso­cia­tion of the seve­ral thou­sand legal per­sons that are its dio­ce­ses, pari­shes, mona­ste­ries, semi­na­ries, schools, con­fra­ter­ni­ties, and so on.

If, the­re­fo­re, the inve­sti­ga­ti­ve organ that embo­dies law no. 3894 were to deter­mi­ne that even a small num­ber of the­se legal enti­ties act in subor­di­na­tion to the Moscow Patriarchate, the Kyiv Metropolitanate under which they are grou­ped would also lose its sta­te regi­stra­tion, if it did nothing to eli­mi­na­te such subor­di­na­tion.

And vice ver­sa, if the inve­sti­ga­tion were to accept the the­sis that the Kyiv Metropolitanate is still for­mal­ly affi­lia­ted with Moscow, the ban would be applied not only to the metro­po­li­ta­na­te but to the thou­sands of dio­ce­ses, pari­shes, etc. asso­cia­ted with it.

In short, in the desi­gn of a post­war Ukraine this uncer­tain­ty over the futu­re of its lar­ger Orthodox Church must also be resol­ved. Certainly not by giving in to the demands of Putin and Kirill.

(Translated by Matthew Sherry : traduttore@​hotmail.​com)

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Sandro Magister is past “vati­ca­ni­sta” of the Italian wee­kly L’Espresso.
The late­st arti­cles in English of his blog Settimo Cielo are on this page.
But the full archi­ve of Settimo Cielo in English, from 2017 to today, is acces­si­ble.
As is the com­ple­te index of the blog www.chiesa, which pre­ce­ded it.